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Security2.h File Reference

Data Structures

struct  _EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL
 

Macros

#define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID   { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } }
 

Typedefs

typedef struct
_EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL 
EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL
 
typedef IN CONST
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL
File
 
typedef IN CONST
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL IN
VOID
FileBuffer
 
typedef IN CONST
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL IN
VOID IN UINTN 
FileSize
 
typedef IN CONST
EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL IN
VOID IN UINTN IN BOOLEAN 
BootPolicy
 

Functions

typedef EFI_STATUS (EFIAPI *EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION)(IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This
 

Variables

EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid
 

Detailed Description

Security2 Architectural Protocol as defined in PI Specification1.2.1 VOLUME 2 DXE

Abstracts security-specific functions from the DXE Foundation of UEFI Image Verification, Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, and User Identity policy for image loading and consoles. This protocol must be produced by a boot service or runtime DXE driver.

This protocol is optional and must be published prior to the EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL. As a result, the same driver must publish both of these interfaces.

When both Security and Security2 Architectural Protocols are published, LoadImage must use them in accordance with the following rules: The Security2 protocol must be used on every image being loaded. The Security protocol must be used after the Securiy2 protocol and only on images that have been read using Firmware Volume protocol.

When only Security architectural protocol is published, LoadImage must use it on every image being loaded.

Copyright (c) 2012 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent

Macro Definition Documentation

#define EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL_GUID   { 0x94ab2f58, 0x1438, 0x4ef1, {0x91, 0x52, 0x18, 0x94, 0x1a, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x68 } }

Global ID for the Security2 Code Architectural Protocol

Typedef Documentation

Function Documentation

typedef EFI_STATUS ( EFIAPI EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION)

The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.

This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in these cases. If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected in order to support the User Identification policy.

Parameters
ThisThe EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
FileA pointer to the device path of the file that is being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
FileBufferA pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
FileSizeThe size of the file.
BootPolicyA boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(), BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
Return values
EFI_SUCCESSThe file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
EFI_SUCCESSThe device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in FileBuffer.
EFI_SUCCESSFileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATIONThe file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file execution table.
EFI_ACCESS_DENIEDThe file specified by File and FileBuffer did not authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may not use File.
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATIONFileBuffer is NULL and the user has no permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATIONFileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The image has been added into the list of the deferred images.

Variable Documentation

EFI_GUID gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid